In Brief
To avoid harmful losses, humans should change their risk attitudes as a function of accumulated value (wealth). Juechems et al. show that humans become more risk averse with increasing cumulative value and that vmPFC encodes the current level of wealth. Juechems et al., 2017 , Neuron 93, 705-714 February 8, 2017 ª 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2016.12.038
INTRODUCTION
Animals accumulate resources through repeated encounters with the world. In an uncertain environment, each encounter carries potential costs and benefits. For example, approaching a food item might expose a foraging animal to predation. The average resources accumulated over a fixed time period are maximized by engaging with encounters (or prospects) that have net positive expected value (i.e., those for which the likely benefits outweigh the likely costs) and avoiding all others. Thus, on average, a stockbroker maximizes weekly profit by investing in shares with positive return, even in a volatile stock market. However, humans and other animals are highly sensitive to the outcome variance, or risk, associated with the choice alternatives (Arrow, 1971; Bernoulli, 1738; O'Neill and Schultz, 2010; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Pratt, 1964; Schultz et al., 2011) . When asked to judge everyday economic scenarios, humans often avoid risky prospects, including those with net positive expected value (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) . Classical theories argue that attitudes toward risk can be accounted for by nonlinearities in the function that maps economic outcomes onto internal estimates of value, or utility, while more recent accounts have extended this framework by applying subjective decision weights to prospects instead of face-value probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Lopes and Oden, 1999) .
However, humans and other animals are not always risk averse. Risk preferences may reverse if the potential gains and losses involved are relatively small (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991) , when outcomes are framed as losses rather than gains (De Martino et al., 2006) , or when primary rather than secondary reinforcers are involved (Hayden and Platt, 2009) , and they may vary across the lifespan (Paulsen et al., 2011) as well as across species (Hayden and Platt, 2009; Platt and Huettel, 2008) . Critically, attitudes toward risk also can change dynamically according to the abundance of resources in the environment and the current level of well-being (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 2014; McDermott et al., 2008; Stephens, 2008; Xue et al., 2010; Yamada et al., 2013) . For example, in resource-scarce environments, where safe hunting options may yield average levels of return that are insufficient for survival, animals typically adopt risky strategies (Abrahams and Dill, 1989; Kolling et al., 2014; Symmonds et al., 2010) . One interpretation of these findings is that animals may have evolved decision policies that promote survival rather than simply seeking to maximize long-run average value of outcomes. An animal wishing to maximize its chances of survival should take risks when resources are scarce (because there is little to lose) but become risk averse when ample resources have been accumulated, because safe choices maximize the confidence that cumulative resources will remain above a fixed threshold (such as zero) (Mallpress et al., 2015; McDermott et al., 2008; Wolf et al., 2007) . However, the so-called budget rule describing this switch in risk sensitivity has yielded inconsistent evidence in the animal literature (Kacelnik and El Mouden, 2013) . In humans, one recent study observed increased risk-taking in order to achieve an externally imposed target, with blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activity in the medial prefrontal cortex scaling with the pressure to accept risky choices (Kolling et al., 2014) . Another study showed violations of dynamic consistency in sequential choices, with the target value encoded in medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Symmonds et al., 2010) . However, both studies involved target values below which all resources were lost. It remains unknown how humans track reward accumulation in the absence of such researcher-induced targets.
In psychology and economics, the relationship between resource level, or wealth, and risk attitudes remains controversial. For instance, prospect theory posits that changes from the status quo matter more than the status quo itself. However, if the reference point, the key improvement of prospect theory over expected utility theory, is not defined as the status quo but rather as an aspiration level, the coding of gains and losses can reverse (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . For instance, receiving $5 will feel like a gain to someone who expected $1 but like a loss to someone who expected $10, even though their final asset positions are identical. Evidence from the field is likewise inconsistent: For example, stock market participation increases with household wealth (Hong et al., 2004) , whereas troubled companies tend to take higher risks than their more affluent counterparts (Bowman, 1982; Kliger and Tsur, 2011) . Moreover, in laboratory experiments, the house money effect showed that risk-seeking is higher after a prior gain (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) , and analysis of sequential decisions suggests that rewards often beget further risky choices (Hayden and Platt, 2009 ) but also can induce risk aversion (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002) , whereas thirsty monkeys become less risk averse with approaching satiety (Yamada et al., 2013) . Multiple factors, including potentially uncontrolled economic factors in field studies (e.g., market liquidity) or differences in the evaluation of primary and secondary rewards in lab-based studies involving monkeys and humans, complicate the interpretation of these findings, and the descriptive relationship between risky behavior and reward accumulation thus remains unclear. Understanding the determinants of risk attitudes in humans and other species is an ongoing challenge in neuroscience, psychology, behavioral ecology, and economics (Arrow, 1971; Caraco, 1981; Hayden and Platt, 2009; Kacelnik and Bateson, 1997; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kolling et al., 2014; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Rudorf et al., 2012; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Schultz et al., 2011) .
Here we asked how human attitudes toward risk vary with the context provided by their current resource levels, or wealth, and how risky behavior is modulated by these variables at the neural level. If risk attitudes are to vary with resource levels, animals must be able to keep track of the cumulative reward they have obtained in a given behavioral context. To date, however, studies of the biology of economic decisions have largely focused on the neural response evoked by the expectation of a momentary outcome or its subsequent receipt (Bartra et al., 2013; Boorman et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2006; De Martino et al., 2009; Lim et al., 2011; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Philiastides et al., 2010; Plassmann et al., 2007) . For example, many studies ask humans to repeatedly choose between consumer products (e.g., food items) or abstract symbols that predict monetary reward, offering a randomly selected chosen outcome at the end of the experiment. Much less is known about how estimates of cumulative reward are encoded over time in human brain signals. Here we designed a gambling task that, in conjunction with functional neuroimaging, allowed us to investigate how brain activity varies with cumulative reward over a discrete temporal context and to measure how risk attitudes change as resources are accumulated. We found that regions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that encoded momentary outcomes also tracked the accumulated level of resources encoded over each temporal context. Finally, we used computational simulations to understand these data, comparing the ability of both standard econometric accounts (such as prospect theory) and novel models to capture human behavior. Surprisingly, the model that provided the best quantitative account of resource-varying risk attitudes was inspired by work in perceptual decision-making, and it posits that the weight (or gain) associated with decision information is adjusted dynamically according to the local context (Cheadle et al., 2014 ). In the current task, the model proposes that the function that maps subjective utility onto a risky choice adapts as resources accumulate. Our theoretical explanation for changing risk attitudes with wealth thus concurs with recent proposals that the coding of sensory signals and economic value can be understood by shared principles of normalization and adaptive gain control Soltani et al., 2012) .
RESULTS
On each trial, human volunteers (n = 20) decided whether to accept or reject a risky gamble. The relative likelihood of winning or losing (reward probability) and the amount that could be won or lost (reward magnitude) were fully disclosed by a central display ( Figure 1A ). Reject choices led to a small but certain loss. On each of five blocks of 75 trials (scanner runs), decisions were made in successive temporal contexts (n = 5 within each scanner run) that were signaled by the color of information on the screen. Participants were told that their cumulative winnings in each context would be entered into a pot of the corresponding color (visible at the top of the screen) and that, upon completion of the experiment, one of the pots in each scanner run would be chosen pseudo-randomly in a lottery procedure and awarded as a financial bonus for participation. Upon completion of a context, the amount entered into the pot was displayed beneath the corresponding colored disc and remained visible for the remainder of the scanner run. However, cumulative reward associated with an ongoing context was not signaled to the participants, but it had to be estimated from the recent trial history. Contexts were of variable length (range 3-22 trials), but the number of remaining trials in the context was signaled to participants via a countdown signal on each trial (see Figure 1A) . The reward-maximizing policy for this task was simply to accept gambles with positive net value and reject the others, ignoring the temporal context. For more details of the task and lottery, see the STAR Methods.
Behavioral Data
Participants elected to gamble on 54.9% (SD = 11.9%) of trials, with a mean response time of 961 (SD = 169) ms. We used a logistic regression approach to identify predictors of human decisions to accept the risky option (i.e., to gamble; see Figure 1B) . As predicted by economic theories, the expected value (EV) of a gamble was a strong positive predictor of acceptance (t 19 = 17.67, p < 1 3 10 À12 ) in regression model 1 (RM1). Over and above this, however, cumulative reward, the sum of all outcomes obtained thus far in the temporal context, was a negative predictor of the tendency to gamble (t 19 = À4.06, p < 0.001, RM1). In other words, the more participants' estimates of accumulated reward grew within a context, the less likely they were to choose the risky option ( Figure 1F tantly, there was no effect of accumulated reward over the five contexts (t 19 = À1.06, p > 0.30, RM2), indicating that participants treated each context as a unique behavioral episode. In addition, there was no significant interaction between wealth and scanning runs elapsed, indicating that the effect of wealth was stable over the five scanning runs (t 19 = 0.36, p > 0.72, RM2) ( Figure S1 ). Overall, the risk (outcome variance; Equation 10) associated with each gamble did not influence choices (t 19 = À0.005, p > 0.99, RM1). However, we observed an interaction between risk and cumulative reward, such that participants became more risk averse with reward accumulation, as displayed by a tendency to select the safe option (t 19 = À3.14, p < 0.01, RM1). The risk aversion bias following reward accumulation also was observed at the level of successive trials, when mean responses were compared as a function of the immediately preceding outcome ( Figure 1C ). Unlike humans and monkeys gambling for liquid reward (Hayden and Platt, 2009 ), our participants eschewed a win-stay, lose-switch strategy, and they were instead less (not more) likely to gamble on the trial following a positive outcome (t 19 = À3.54, p < 0.005, RM1).
In a subsequent analysis, we plotted how choices mapped onto the expected value of each gamble, separately for trials where accumulated reward was higher or lower (within-participant median split). Psychometric functions were shifted toward safe choices following higher reward accumulation, as indicated by a nonparametric test on the inflection point of a best-fitting sigmoid function (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.005). By contrast, there was no difference in slope (p > 0.65) for the psychometric functions ( Figures 1D and 1E ). Taken together, these behavioral data show that human attitudes toward risk varied dynamically during resource accumulation, with risky choices giving way to safe choices as wealth gradually accumulated. In other words, cumulative reward (across an arbitrarily defined temporal context) is a critical factor determining attitudes toward risk in human economic decisions.
BOLD Correlates of Momentary and Cumulative Reward
We began by measuring how the brain responded to the receipt of momentary reward, correlating BOLD signals with the monetary outcome received (general linear model [GLM1]; Figure 2A ; Table S1 ). As anticipated, this analysis strongly implicated structures including the ventral striatum (left peak [x,y,z]: À14, 12, À6; right peak: 14, 12, À6) and a rostral portion of the medial prefrontal cortex; for consistency with the past literature, we call this the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (sub-peak: À2, 52, À2). Note, however, that the peaks in striatum and vmPFC belong to one large cluster and are reported to aid understanding of the cluster's spatial extent. These reported peaks, and all others reported throughout the Results, were situated within clusters of voxels that survived correction for multiple comparisons using a clusterwise false discovery rate (FDR) approach (Chumbley and Friston, 2009; Genovese et al., 2002) .
However, in order for risk preferences to vary with accumulated wealth in our task, the brain must have access to a latent variable encoding the current level of resources. Thus, we next asked whether the vmPFC BOLD signal tracks estimates of accumulated reward over the course of each temporal context. In GLM1, we also included a competing regressor encoding the sum of all outcomes obtained across the temporal context. This regressor encoded cumulative reward up to and including the immediately preceding trial, but not the current trial, and was thus orthogonal to the predictor based on momentary outcome. This regressor also captured unique variance in the vmPFC BOLD signal (Figure 2B) , with a peak in a slightly more dorsofrontal region of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (À6, 64, 2), as well as in the striatum (left peak: À14, 24, À2; right peak: 10, 20, 2). Both of these clusters survived FDR correction for multiple comparisons. The portion of the vmPFC that responded to current trial outcome and that which responded to accumulated reward were overlapping (Figures 2A and 2B ). Indeed, voxels within the vmPFC that responded to outcome at a threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected) were also, on average, sensitive to cumulative reward (t 19 = 3.18, p < 0.005), even when regions of interest (ROIs) were defined in a leave-one-out fashion over participants to avoid potentially circular inference. We also observed responses to accumulated reward in the left angular gyrus (peak: À54, À60, 30) and unexpected areas, such as the right occipital lobe (38, À92, 14); a full list of activations is described in Table S2 .
Computational Model of Risk Attitude Adjustment
Risk preferences during economic judgments are often characterized using prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 ), a descriptive model of how losses, gains, and probabilities are weighted before being combined to form a subjective internal estimate (expected utility). In prospect theory, the expected utility of accepting a gamble U(accept) is computed by combining the output of two transfer functions w( ) and v( ) that respectively map objective probabilities and relative monetary gains (g  + ) and losses (g À ) onto corresponding subjective quantities as follows:
The expected utility of rejecting the gamble is related to the certain fixed loss (g 0 ) that is incurred on these trials,
The decision-relevant quantity, DU, is then computed as the difference between the accept and reject utilities as follows:
Decisions are simulated by passing DU through a softmax choice function with slope s and bias b,
( Equation 4) However, the key question for our purposes is how the changes in risk attitudes as a function of reward accumulation observed in behavior can be reflected in the subjective values or utilities. Specifically, prospect theory postulates a mechanism by which each prospect is coded as a gain or loss relative to a reference point. In this study, we implicitly defined the reference point by framing the information on the screen as a positive or negative outcome. Such a model, however, would predict no change in risk attitudes as a function of reward accumulation, contrary to our behavioral finding. Here we compared six models that are all based on prospect theory, with different conceptualizations of the reference point (summary in Figure 3A ). First is a static model in which decision-makers followed our implicit framing and represented the gamble as a deviation from the status quo. Second is a wealthdependent model in which participants compare final wealth positions. Participants would thus compute the prospects relative to the status quo wealth (R) as follows:
In this model, the reference R affects the perception of the monetary incentives of both accept and reject options prior to their transformation into a subjective utility signal ( Figure 3A) .
Third is three curvature models in which one of the parameters of the prospect theory function (the curvature of v( ), the loss aversion parameter lambda, or the probability parameter of w( )) at trial t was determined by a linear function of status quo wealth as follows:
where q stands in for the parameter in question (from Equations 12 and 13), and d is the update rate. Finally, we formulate an adaptive gain model that builds on a general framework for adaptive decision-making that is most often used to account for perceptual decisions (Cheadle et al., 2014) . Here the gains and losses g + and g À map directly onto the gain and loss offered on each trial, without being normalized by R. However, monetary outcomes on each trial t drive an update of the bias term (b from Equation 4), such that it moves toward R:
where a is an update strength parameter. This adaptive gain model (Cheadle et al., 2014) thus updates the inflection point b toward the right (higher utility) when rewards are obtained from risky gambles, thereby reducing the probability that further risks will be run, and vice versa for losses ( Figure 3B ). Hence, one can construe the reference point in this model as a threshold defined in utility space. Equivalently, the bias represents an additive increase in value of the reject option. We compared these six prospect theory models by fitting them to human responses and comparing their likelihoods using Bayesian model selection (Stephan et al., 2009 ) with leave-one-out cross-fitting over the five independent scanner runs. Bayesian model selection estimates the exceedance probability of a candidate model being the best-fitting model out of a selection of models, by comparing not only the summed log likelihoods but also the pattern of fit across the cohort. Hence, a model with better fit in the summed log likelihood will only have a high exceedance probability if it also fits best for a majority of subjects in the cohort. Cross-validation with separate training and test data reduces both overfitting, and it mitigates the necessity of correcting for any increases in model complexity due to the differing number of parameters in each model variant.
The adaptive gain variant of prospect theory fit better than its five competitors (see Table 1 for model comparison and mean parameters) on both the summed log likelihood and the exceedance probability with p = 0.96 versus the second-ranked static model with p = 0.02. It also fit better than other model variants, (1) where R was calculated by weighting accumulated reward via an exponential function, or (2) a model postulating the reference point as an aspiration level, which increased as participants progressed through the sequence, such that participants aspire to higher wealth by the end of a context (Table 1; STAR  Methods) .
Additionally, when we performed logistic regression on the choices predicted by the models, we found that the adaptive gain-inspired model recreated the effect of accumulated reward ( Figure 3D ). In contrast, the model with second-best fit, the static prospect theory (PT) model, did not capture this aspect of the data. In summary, participants dynamically adjust their decision policies via a roving function that maps utility onto choices, rather than rescaling estimated utility according to the current level of wealth.
To identify candidate brain regions encoding decision information, we computed the log likelihood ratio of choosing to gamble, which we here call decision value. It reflected an unbounded estimate of choice probability as follows:
Previous studies have demonstrated that, during rewardguided decisions, BOLD signals (Boorman et al., 2009 ) and neuronal firing rates (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006) encode the relative value of a chosen and unchosen options. We were thus interested in how the neural representation of the decision value (DV) depended on participants' choices, searching for voxels that encoded DV (a signed estimate of the value of gambling) differentially during accept and reject decisions. This DV 3 choice interaction (GLM2) yielded negative correlations in the dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC; À2, 32, 42), as well as in the insula (left peak: À34, 20, À2; right peak: 34, 20, À6) and angular gyrus (54, À52, 42) . These data are shown in Figure 4A (similar results were obtained when we used raw choice probability values, bounded between 0 and 1). Specifically, dmPFC and insula correlated positively with DV on reject trials and negatively on accept trials, consistent with previously described encoding of the value of the unchosen option in these regions (GLM3) (Boorman et al., 2009; Tsetsos et al., 2014 ) (see Table S3 and Figure 4B ). Of note, we obtained similar findings in GLM1 and GLM2 even when controlling for reaction time, as an additional, non-orthogonalized regressor, suggesting that our effects are not secondary to more general effects of choice difficulty.
Simulating Choices as a Function of Model Parameter Alpha
To investigate the potential costs and benefits of the dynamic policy adopted by our participants, we conducted a simple simulation. We computed likely mean and variance of cumulative outcomes as a function of different values of a, the update parameter in our adaptive model that controls how sharply risk aversion should grow (or fall) with wealth (Figures 3A-3C ; see the STAR Methods). These simulations showed that, although an optimal agent (with a = 0) on average maximizes the expected value over the course of the experiment, this comes at the expense of considerable variability in overall cumulative outcomes. By contrast, averaged over simulations, an agent with a > 0 obtains a lower mean cumulative reward tally, but the agent is less likely to experience a resource level that falls below the survival threshold (i.e., zero). The same holds for suboptimal agents who exhibit prospect theory preferences. In other words, humans and other animals may pursue economic decision policies, and adopt risk attitudes, that lead to satisfactory but suboptimal levels of cumulative outcome, in order to avoid the risk that resources drop below a perilous critical level.
BOLD Correlates of Temporal Structure
Our task featured a unique temporal structure, which required participants to keep track of a trial's position within each behavioral episode. Although proximity to a new episode did not influence risk attitudes, neural data suggested that participants were sensitive to the passage of time within each episode. Specifically, the regressor encoding the proximity to context termination (from GLM1) captured positive BOLD responses in several cortical areas, including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; 10, 28, 38), supplementary motor area (SMA; 6, 8, 62), and right dorsolateral PFC (22, 56, 6)-areas that have been implicated in the decision-making circuitry, as well as in the occipital lobe (global peak: 10, À72, 2) ( Figure 5 ; Table S4 ).
DISCUSSION
Human decisions are sensitive both to the expected value of an economic prospect and to the level of risk (or outcome variance) that it entails. Typically, humans are averse to risk, and this phenomenon can be accounted for with the classic framework provided by prospect theory, in which losses loom larger than gains due to a steeper subjective loss function. Here we observed that humans making successive risky gambles became more averse to risk as they accumulated reward within a discrete temporal context. This behavior was best captured by a computational simulation in which cumulative reward engendered a dynamic shift in the transfer function that maps subjective values (utilities) onto choices. Of note, this account fared better in describing human choices and the pattern of BOLD activations than classic prospect theory models, which propose instead that status quo wealth modulates the subjective valuation of monetary outcomes rather than acting on their subsequent mapping to decision signals.
The Budget Rule and Loss Aversion
Why does risk aversion increase with cumulative reward? One ecologically plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that economic decision policies have evolved not simply to maximize total expected value but rather to minimize the probability that cumulative reward falls below some threshold value. This policy promotes survival in naturalistic settings where death ensues when resources fall toward zero. For example, animals that forage over the diurnal cycle may have evolved risk attitudes that maximize the likely lowest level of resources to be obtained during the day in order to provide the best chance of surviving through the night (Caraco, 1981; Kolling et al., 2014) . Consistent with this explanatory framework, behavioral ecologists have noted that asymmetric, convex value functions, such as those proposed by prospect theory, predict that risk aversion should naturally increase as resources grow further from the survival threshold (McDermott et al., 2008) . Evidence for this resource budget rule has been inconsistent, however (Kacelnik and El Mouden, 2013) , and the precise mapping of resource level onto evolutionary fitness is a subject of debate (Houston et al., 2014) . Similarly, it has been noted that taxi drivers set themselves a target income for the day beyond which they stop working (Camerer et al., 1997; K} oszegi and Rabin, 2006) . The policy that humans adopt here achieves a similar feat: it minimizes the chance of running a loss at the end of the episode, as if participants had aspired to achieve a net positive outcome (Lopes and Oden, 1999) . This model would be captured by the wealth-dependent model, in which positive wealth pushes the gambles into the domain of gains (less risk-taking), while negative wealth predicts more risk-taking. Here we also tested a variant of the aspiration model, which changed the aspiration level according to the position in the sequence to avoid the assumption that participants aspire to the same discrete level of wealth at every point in time. In contrast, however, the adaptive gain model does not impose a fixed threshold or reference point in the space of final wealth, but rather it describes how each individual outcome affects subsequent risk attitudes. Intuitively, this can be achieved by the policy that humans adopt here: to shift from risk-seeking (when resources are low, and there is little to lose) to risk aversion (as resources grow, and a stable status quo wealth has been achieved) over the course of a behavioral episode.
A B Figure 4. BOLD Effects of DV by Choice Interaction
(A) Sagittal and axial slices depicting the dmPFC (global peak) and insula clusters on a common color scale. Images are thresholded at p < 0.001, unc. from GLM2.
(B) Encoding of DV (BOLD beta) in the dmPFC, insula, and vmPFC depending on choice from GLM3. Data from these three regions were extracted from the ROI described in the STAR Methods. Bar height is across-participant mean, and error bars are SEM (***p < 0.001 for a twotailed t test against zero with 19 degrees of freedom).
Prospect Theory and the Reference Point
In prospect theory, outcomes are evaluated relative to a reference point that encodes prospects as either changes in status quo wealth or an aspiration wealth, leading to differing subjective utilities (and consequent choices) with alternate framings of a risky prospect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) . Prospect theory deliberately leaves the reference point vague to facilitate a wide range of applications. However, to our knowledge, the reference point always changes the value function in the classical formulation of prospect theory. For instance, a recent account describes prospect theory as ''efficient perceptual distortion,'' where the reference point is the mode of the distribution of expected outcomes (Woodford, 2012 ). An alternative, however, is that the status quo does not influence how outcomes are evaluated, but instead it drives a decision bias that reduces the frequency of risky relative to safe choices, given equivalent subjective utility.
Here we pitted these accounts head to head using statistical model comparison techniques, and we found that the latter provides a better explanation of human choices. While the curvature models (especially the one based on v( ) and the loss aversion parameter lambda) could, in principle, capture the same qualitative effects, they fared worse in quantitative model comparison. Our findings are thus consistent with a general framework that has suggested that internal decision variables, including estimates of both sensory signal strength and economic value, are subject to an adaptive mechanism that confers time-dependent normalization (Carandini and Heeger, 2011; Cox and Kable, 2014; Parducci, 1965; Rangel and Clithero, 2012; Summerfield and Tsetsos, 2015) . One simple description of this mechanism is provided by a model in which the function by which internal variables map onto choices adjusts dynamically to control behavior. This account is inspired by earlier work that described how context modulates decision signals in a psychophysical setting (Cheadle et al., 2014) .
The Neural Underpinnings of Reward Accumulation
Analysis of BOLD signals obtained during the task shed further light on the mechanisms by which cumulative resources influenced risky choices, and it helped us chart their neural underpinnings. Previous research has extensively explored the neural mechanisms by which subjective values and choice variables are encoded during decisions about risky prospects, such as monetary gambles (De Martino et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2011; Knutson et al., 2005; Lim et al., 2011; Plassmann et al., 2007; Tom et al., 2007) . However, past studies have overlooked the question of how brain responses vary as rewards are accumulated over time. Two particularly relevant studies either imposed a priori target levels (Kolling et al., 2014) or did not provide choice feedback to participants, which renders analyses of reward accumulation over time impossible (Symmonds et al., 2010) . Here we show that the ventral portion of the medial prefrontal cortex encodes not only momentary value signals, as previously demonstrated, but also the cumulative tally of reward obtained over the past history defined by a discrete temporal context. This occurred even though ongoing resource levels were not signaled to the participant within each context, suggesting that the vmPFC encodes a latent, internal tally of cumulative wealth. This finding is consistent with a view of the vmPFC as tracking outcomes as they pertain to long-run goals rather than to shorter-term hedonic outcomes .
Structuring the World in Time
In our task, the temporal context was defined in such a way that it was irrelevant for the reward-maximizing policy, which was simply to accept gambles with net positive EV, irrespective of contextual factors such as cumulative reward or the time elapsed within a context or over the course of the experiment. However, both risk attitudes and accompanying neural signals varied with cumulative reward over a distinct temporal context. Indeed, although time elapsed within a context did not influence decisions, BOLD signals in diverse cortical regions varied substantially as each context unfolded. It may be that humans have a strong tendency to break down an ongoing, unstructured episode into discrete temporal chunks and to monitor resource levels within these chunks, as proposed by hierarchical models of reward-guided learning (Botvinick et al., 2009; Holroyd and Yeung, 2012) .
Notably, in our experiment, the cumulative reward tally was signaled to the participant at the end of each temporal context, motivating participants to monitor their cumulative outcomes up to the point at which they were revealed. Previous studies have shown that signals in dmPFC and underlying cingulate gyrus track proximity to an interim goal state where reward or feedback is provided (Hayden et al., 2011 ; Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011; Shidara and Richmond, 2002) . In one particularly relevant study, dmPFC tracked the risk pressure that increased as participants struggled to reach an experimenter-determined reward threshold, below which cumulative reward was lost (Kolling et al., 2014) . Our study shows that, in the absence of an externally imposed survival threshold, humans nevertheless pursue a wealth-accrual policy that is strongly modulated by the need to conserve constant positive cumulative reward levels.
STAR+METHODS
Detailed methods are provided in the online version of this paper and include the following: 
STAR+METHODS KEY RESOURCES TABLE CONTACT FOR REAGENT AND RESOURCE SHARING
All requests for further information, the fMRI data and associated code should be directed to and will be fulfilled by the Lead Contact: Mr. Keno Juechems, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, keno.juchems@psy.ox.ac.uk.
EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECT DETAILS
Twenty healthy volunteers (7 men, mean age: 23.25 years, SD = 3.4) with no history of psychiatric or neurological disorders participated in the study. Participants gave informed consent prior to scanning, and the study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Granada. Participants' compensation was 25V, plus a performance-based bonus.
METHOD DETAILS

Task details
Each trial offered the choice between accepting and rejecting a monetary gamble (see Figure 1A) . A central pie-chart indicated the probability of winning by a colored area (see context manipulation below), and the probability of losing as a black area. The possible monetary losses and gains were displayed to the left and right of the screen, respectively. Gain and loss magnitudes ranged from 1V to 3V, and À1V to À3V. Probabilities used were 1/3, 0.5, and 2/3. Gambles were sampled uniformly at random from these values and were always mixed (gain and loss). Accept choices led to the gamble being played out, while reject choices led to a small certain loss of 0.10V.
Context manipulation
The 75 trials in each of the five scanner run (375 trials in total) were allocated to successive ''contexts,'' each associated with an unambiguous display color. Each context was of variable length (3-22 trials). While a participant was in a given context, the pie-chart indicating reward probability would be shaded in the current context's color. Additionally, a countdown in the center of the screen conveyed the number of trials (including the current trial) remaining until the end of that context. The countdown font color also corresponded to the current context's color. The sequence of contexts in each session was displayed as 5 colored disks on the top of the screen. Whenever participants concluded a context, their cumulative earnings of that context were displayed on a 'bonus screen' for a duration of 2 s. These earnings would then be displayed below the corresponding disc, for the remainder of the scanner run.
Trial sequence
Stimuli were presented for a duration of 3 s. Within the first 2 s, participants could respond by pressing a button with their left or right hand. Correspondence between response (accept or reject) and hand was counterbalanced across participants. Failure to respond resulted in a penalty of 1V. Immediately after their response, trial outcome was displayed in the middle beneath the pie chart and was visible for the remainder of the trial duration. No feedback about accumulated reward was given until the 'bonus screen', which informed participants after the conclusion of context about the accumulated reward within that context. All intervals between screens were drawn from a uniform distribution between 3 s and 7 s.
Reward at the end of a run: lottery After each run, one context was selected for payment in a lottery. Unbeknownst to participants, this procedure was pseudorandomized so as to avoid very high gains and very high losses, which would be incompatible with local ethical guidelines. Thus, only contexts (60.2%) in which cumulative earnings ranged from À4V to +6V were used for the lottery and chosen with uniform probability. Participants did not report suspicion that not all contexts entered the lottery procedure. At the end of the experiment participants were paid the sum of all five lotteries, on average 13V (SD = 5.64V, range: 2.50V to 24.10V). No participant finished with negative wealth. Training Directly prior to fMRI scanning, participants completed one run of the task, but no reward were paid out for this session and all analyses are based on the fMRI data only.
Simulation
We simulated how the update strength a influences the mean and variance of cumulative earnings within an episode. An agent imbued with variable degrees of a played through N = 10,000 simulated runs (75 trials each) of the task. For simplicity, the agent based its choices on a trial's EV, which is a special case of PT utility with linear transfer functions. The indifference point was set to EV = À0.1, where both accept and reject choices yield the same expected payoff, while the slope was set to 10 16 , corresponding to a step-like function. The range for a was set to À0:5%a%0:5, where a = 0 corresponds to a 'static' agent that is optimal with respect to reward maximization.
FMRI: Data acquisition MRI data were acquired on a 3T Siemens scanner. T1 weighted structural images were recorded directly prior to the task using an MPRAGE sequence: 1 3 1 3 1 mm 3 voxel resolution, 176 3 256 3 256 grid, TR = 1900ms, TE = 2.52ms, TI = 900ms. Each fMRI image contained 32 axial echo-planar images (EPI) acquired in descending sequence with a voxel resolution of 3.5 mm 3 isotropic, slice spacing of 4.2mm, TR = 2000ms, flip angle = 80
, and TE of 30ms. 1700 EPI were recorded per participant, with the exception of three participants (1478, 1610 and 1644 images), resulting in a scanning time of about 57 min. Data were pre-processed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust, London). Data were corrected for motion artifacts using the ArtRepair toolbox (http://cibsr.stanford.edu/ tools/human-brain-project/artrepair-software.html). As EPI acquisition used a descending sequence, images were corrected for slice time acquisition with the middle slice (at TR/2 = 1 s) as reference to minimize interpolation errors (Sladky et al., 2011) . Scans were realigned to the first scan within each session. The anatomical scan was co-registered to the mean of all functional images. Anatomical scans were normalized to the standard MNI152 template brain. The functional EPI images were then normalized and smoothed with a full width half maximum Gaussian kernel of 8mm.
QUANTIFICATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Throughout the paper, a statistical test was deemed significant when the resulting p value for a two-tailed test was lower than 0.05. Details about the specific test used, its N, measures of center and dispersion, and degrees of freedom can be found in the results section and in the corresponding figure captions.
Behavior: Data analysis
The following regressors were transformed before entering analyses: Accumulated reward For each trial, reward within its corresponding context were summed up to, but not including, the current trial. Accumulated reward were always zero on each first trial within a context, and orthogonal to trial outcome (r = À0.02).
Proximity to next color
The proximity regressor was constructed as the reciprocal of the number of trials to the next context, thereby bounding values between zero and one. Expected value (EV) was calculated using the following formula:
EVðx; p; y; 1 À pÞ = px + ð1 À pÞy
where x corresponds to a possible gain, y to a possible loss, and p to the probability to win.
Risk as outcome variance was calculated as follows:
Riskðx; p; y; 1 À p; EVÞ = pðx À EVÞ 2 + ð1 À pÞðy À EVÞ
(10)
Logistic regression of choice Participants' choices were analyzed at the single-trial level, using a logistic regression to predict the probability of choosing to gamble. The estimated beta weights across the cohort were then used for a two-tailed one-sample t test against zero. Regression model 1 contained the following regressors: EV, risk, accumulated reward, last outcome, last choice, proximity to context boundary, EV by accumulated reward interaction, and risk by accumulated reward interaction. This model is presented in the main text in Figure 1B . Regression model 2 added several controls to RM1: accumulated reward as a running sum of the previous eight trials (across contexts), accumulated reward across the whole scanning run, number of trials elapsed in scanning run, number of trials elapsed in context, the amount of trials in the current context, the financial bonus from the previous run (''last lottery''), number of scanning runs elapsed, and interactions of proximity by EV, proximity by risk, and accumulated reward by scanning runs elapsed. None of these additional regressors were significant (all jt 19 j < 1.38, p > 0.18, Figure S1 ).
Behavior: Model specification and comparison All models shared the following features of the PT utility functions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , w(p) and v(x):
vðxÞ = x b ; for xR0 (12) vðxÞ = À lðÀxÞ b ; for x < 0:
In all models, utility was mapped onto choice using Equation 4 from the main text. The function approximates a deterministic step function for s/N with the step at b. Wealth-dependent Prospect Theory model with exponential leak Working memory capacities might limit an accurate representation of accumulated reward, so we tested another model, in which accumulated reward were calculated as the exponentially weighted sum (EWS) of all previous outcomes. It computes utility with . A positive update parameter shifts the indifference point to the right when participants incurred a gain and vice versa for losses (and the reverse for negative parameters). Thus, participant will become risk-averse after a series of gains and more risk-seeking after losses. On each first trial within a new context, the indifference point was reset to its initial value as estimated by the model. This procedure is warranted, since participants treated each context as a new episode and there was no effect of accumulated reward across contexts in RM 2 (t 19 = À0.22, p > 0.82).
Aspiration model
We tested another model, in which participants aspire to a certain level of wealth depending on their position in the sequence. Gains and losses are added to current wealth and then compared to the aspiration level:
Model comparison Parameters were fit separately for each participant in a cross-validation framework on the basis of four out of the five scanner runs and then tested on the left out run, such that each run functions as independent dataset once. MATLAB's simulated annealing toolbox (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983 ) was used to find the optimal parameters which maximized log-likelihood, given by:
lnðpðchoice j qÞÞ;
where p(choice j q) is the predicted probability of making the same choice as the participant given parameter set q. Non-response trials (n = 56 out of N = 7500) were excluded from all models. q was constrained to:
0 < b; l; g % + 5; À1% b; a % + 1; 0 < s%20; 0 < z%1; À10 % c; d % + 10:
Behavioral models were compared using SPM's Bayesian model selection function. The function's input was an n-by-k matrixwhere n is the number of participants and k is the number of models -, which contained the log-likelihoods of each participant for each model. A model was deemed better than its competitors when its summed log-likelihood across participants and its exceedance probability -as estimated by SPM's function -were higher than all others.
FMRI: Data analysis
The five scanning sessions were concatenated and constants included in the GLMs to identify runs and account for differences in mean activation and scanner drift. Late events (less than 16 s before end of run) were removed to avoid fitting a stimulus across two runs. Stimulus onsets were incremented by 1 s to account for slice timing correction to the middle slice, which occurred at TR/2 = 1 s after stimulus onset (Sladky et al., 2011) . Microtime onset was set to the first slice. All GLMs used stick regressors with zero duration locked to the onset of the gamble (including the parametric modulation of outcome, because feedback followed approximately $1 s after choices). Similar results were obtained using regressors of duration 3 s (length of trial). We also included the 6 motion parameters derived from pre-processing as nuisance regressors, as well as the temporal and dispersion derivatives of the standard hemodynamic response function (HRF). Automatic orthogonalization was switched off. Data were analyzed with SPM12. All contrasts were constructed as simple t-contrasts with first-level t-maps as input. We only report clusters that fell below an FDR-corrected p value of 0.05, as reported by SPM's standard results table with a setting of cluster extent to 10 voxels or more and a voxelwise threshold of p < 0.001. In addition, we report all main results using the statistical non-parametric mapping toolbox (SnPM13; http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm) in Figure S2 . The settings for the SnPM analysis were the defaults: 5,000 permutations, variance smoothing of 8mm isotropic (as recommended for degrees of freedom smaller than 20), cluster forming threshold of 0.0001 (a Z-value of 3.71), and cluster-wise family-wise error rate of 0.05. Data were visualized using the xjview toolbox for SPM (http://www.alivelearn. net/xjview).
General Linear Model (GLM) 1 included: choice (accept > reject), trial outcome, accumulated reward, and proximity to next context, all as parametric modulators time-locked to stimulus onset. The goal of GLM 1 was to identify correlates of accumulated reward over and above correlates of trial outcome. GLM 2 included: the GLM1 regressors, DV as given by Equation 8 in the main text of the best-fitting behavioral model, and an interaction of DV and choice. Here, DV was calculated after fitting to the entire dataset. The goal of GLM 2 was to identify candidate regions for the late stage process by which risk preferences change with accumulated reward.
GLM 3 split trials into accept and reject trial conditions, and estimated the betas separately for each condition: trial outcome (for accept trials only), accumulated reward, proximity to next context, and DV. We used GLM 3 to investigate the pattern of activations identified in the DV by choice interaction from GLM 2.
All models also included the context outcomes -the 'bonus screens' -with parametric modulation of context outcome time-locked to bonus screen onset. Region of interest (ROI) extraction ROI were extracted in a leave-one-out procedure: Each participant's mask was estimated on the basis of all other participants, while leaving out the current participant. ROI masks were then constructed by taking all significant voxels (with p < 0.001, unc.) that fell within the target region (given by xjview's database), e.g., within medial PFC.
From GLM 1, we extracted an ROI for trial outcome in the vmPFC. From GLM 2, we extracted two ROI from the DV by choice interaction contrast: one in the dmPFC, and another encompassing the bilateral insula.
Data and Software Availability
The behavioral data alongside essential scripts for analysis have been deposited in a public access GitHub repository at: https:// github.com/summerfieldlab/juechems_etal_2017.
